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MAINTAINING ATHLETICS AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF A
HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GIVES
HOPE TO DISABLED STUDENT-ATHLETES IN WASHINGTON
v. INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Although disabled [students] encounter difficult hurdles in
their academic and social lives, evidence indicates that disabled persons who participate in athletic activities experience better health,
personal satisfaction, and increased self-esteem." 1 Unfortunately,
many high school athletic associations have enacted maximum age
and maximum semester requirements that disabled student-athletes cannot meet because, as a result of their learning disabilities,
2
they have been in school longer than their other classmates.
Therefore, Congress attempted to remedy discrimination against
disabled student-athletes by passing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 3 in 1973, which "prohibits discrimination against the disabled by governmental agencies receiving federal financial
assistance."'4 Congress broadened the protection of disabled individuals when it passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 5 ("ADA")
in 1990, which applied to both public and private entities operating
1. Colleen M. Evale, Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association: The
Sixth Circuit Sets Up Age Restrictions as Insurmountable Hurdles for Learning-Disabled
High School Student-Athletes, 5 SPORTS LAw. J. 109, 110 (1998) (citing Kathleen DeSantis, The Disabled Student-Athlete: Gaining a Place on the PlayingField, 5 J. COMM. &
ENT. L. 517, 517 (1983)); see also Sande L. Buhai, PracticeMakes Perfect: Reasonable
Accommodations of Law Students with Disabilitiesin ClinicalPlacements, 36 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 137, 139 (1999) (pointing out that people with disabilities face obstacles each
day that people without disabilities take for granted).
2. See generally, McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d
453, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that eight semester rule did not violate Rehabilitation Act or ADA); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037
(6th Cir. 1995) (holding that age requirement violated neither Rehabilitation Act
nor ADA); Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1205 (D. Or.
1999) (holding that waiver of eight semester rule was reasonable modification to
accommodate student's disability); Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 9i3 F.Supp. 663, 671 (D. Con. 1996), vaat.t-d as moot, 94 F.3d 96
(2d Cir. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction to impose waiver of age eligibility
requirement).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999).
4. Mark R. Freitas, Applying the RehabilitationAct and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Student-Athletes, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 139, 139 (1998) (quoting Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting Chance Under the ADA?, 14 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57, 57 (1997)).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1999).
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places of public accommodation. 6 The courts are split on the issue
of whether disabled student-athletes may use the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA to obtain waivers of the athletic eligibility
7
requirements.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of learning-disabled
students' rights to challenge maximum semester requirements in
Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc.8 In Washington,
a learning disabled student-athlete was denied athletic eligibility
during his senior year because he failed to meet the Indiana High
School Athletic Association's ("IHSAA") eight semester requirement.9 The district court held that Washington should be granted
a waiver of the eight semester eligibility requirement, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed this holding. 10
This Note focuses on the applicability of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to disabled student-athletes and their efforts to gain
the same athletic opportunities that are available to non-disabled
student-athletes. Part II of this Note states the relevant facts in
Washington." Part III explains the purposes of the Rehabilitation
Act12 and the ADA 13 as well as how the courts have applied these
acts to athletic eligibility requirements.' 4 Parts IV and V analyze the
6. See Freitas, supra note 4, at 139-40 (explaining how ADA is broader than
Rehabilitation Act).
7. Compare McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463 (holding that disabled student-athlete
would not receive waiver of eight semester rule), with Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at
1205 (holding that disabled student-athlete would receive waiver of eight semester
rule). See also Christopher W. Lewis, Comment, Athletic Eligibility - Too High a Hurdle for the LearningDisabled, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 75, 113 (1998) (observing that
courts must resolve conflict between laws that protect disabled students and purposes of athletic eligibility rules because "[1]earning disabled students who enjoy
an equal opportunity in the classroom through special education curriculums [sic]
are penalized for participating in these programs by athletic association eligibility
rules").
8. 181 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of the facts in Washington, see infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
9. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842-43 (indicating that student-athlete's second
semester of 1998-1999 academic year was his ninth semester because of delay
caused by learning disability).
10. See id. at 854 (affirming district court's decision to grant preliminary injunction enjoining IHSAA from denying Washington athletic eligibility).
11. For a discussion of the relevant facts in Washington, see infra notes 17-38
and accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see infra notes 41-63
and accompanying text.
13. For a detailed discussion of the ADA, see infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of both maximum age and maximum semester eligibility
requirements, see infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
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Seventh Circuit's opinion in Washington.15 Finally, Part VI explores
the effect of the Washington decision on disabled student-athletes'
ability to prevent discrimination in athletic programs. 16
II.

FAcTS

In Washington, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the refusal to waive a high school athletic association's eight semester rule
for a student-athlete whose learning disability caused him to fail at
school violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.17 In deciding the case, the court adopted a test balancing
irreparable harm to the student-athlete against any threatened
harm to the IHSAA or the public. 18 The court found that the student-athlete would be harmed irreparably if he did not obtain the
injunction allowing him to participate in athletics. 19 The studentathlete's interest in participating in athletics outweighed IHSAA's
interest in avoiding financial and administrative burdens. 20 In addition, the student-athlete's interest outweighed the public's interest
15. For a detailed analysis and critique of the Seventh Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 103-45 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's effect on the state law in this
area, see infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
17. See Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 845 (7th
Cir. 1999) (basing preliminary injunction on ADA but also interpreting other
courts' analysis of section 504 of Rehabilitation Act). For purposes of this case, the
Seventh Circuit pointed out that the standards applicable to both section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are nearly identical because Tide II
was modeled after the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 845 n.6. As the court stated,
the "chief difference between the two statutes is that the Rehabilitation Act applies
only to entities receiving federal funding, while Title II of the ADA contains no
such limitation." Id. In addition, "the Rehabilitation Act requires that the discrimination be solely by reason of disability, while the ADA only requires that the discrimination be by reason of disability." Id.
18. See id. at 853-54 (determining that student-athlete's interests outweighed
any financial and administrative burdens).
19. See id. at 853 (identifying testimony that denying student-athlete chance to
hskethball wnld have devatating effects). The court discovered that the stublaV

dent had been frustrated academically and socially throughout his life, and that his
grades had improved when he started participating in athletics. However, he lost
that motivation when he found out that the IHSAA had declared him ineligible to
participate in athletics. See id. at 853 (concluding that balancing in favor of student-athlete was not abuse of discretion by district court).
20. See id. (noting that waiver would not place undue financial or administrative burden on IHSAA because of its established waiver inquiry policy). Therefore,
a few additional case inquiries for students with learning disabilities would not
constitute an excessive burden on the IHSAA. The student in this case was the first
to ask for a waiver in more than a decade, and the public's interest in fair competition would not be substantially affected. See id. at 852-53.
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in not displacing another student-athlete and maintaining a level
21
field of athletic competition.
Washington arose out of a request by a student-athlete, Eric
Washington, and his high school, Central Catholic High School
("Central Catholic"), for a preliminary injunction enjoining the IHSAA from denying Washington athletic eligibility for the second semester of the 1998-1999 school year. 22 Washington alleged that the
IHSAA discriminated against him under Title II of the ADA when it
refused to grant his request for a waiver of its rule limiting a student's athletic eligibility to the first eight semesters after the student's commencement of the ninth grade ("eight semester rule").23
Throughout elementary school, school officials allowed Washington to advance to the next grade despite his academic insufficiency.2 4 However, he was held back in the eighth grade for the

1994-1995 school year. 25 Unfortunately, he continued to receive
failing grades, but school officials decided to advance him to the
ninth grade at Jefferson Lafayette High School at the beginning of
the second semester of the 1994-1995 school year. 26 Once again,
Washington received failing grades for that semester and the following academic year. 2 7 As a result, Washington dropped out of
high school at the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year. 28
During the summer of 1997, Washington participated in a Central Catholic sponsored three-on-three basketball tournament. 29
After speaking with the Central Catholic basketball coach, Chad
Dunwoody, Washington decided to attend Central Catholic, subse21. See id. (stating that no interest outweighed harm caused by denying student-athlete access to play basketball). Similarly, the court found that the displacement of another student trying out for athletics would not tip the scales against the
clear evidence of irreparable harm to the learning disabled student who requested
the waiver if he were denied eligibility. See id.
22. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842-43 (requesting waiver of eight semester
eligibility requirement).
23. See id. at 843 (noting that IHSAA should grant waiver if strict enforcement
would not accomplish purpose of rule, if spirit of rule would be violated and if
showing of undue hardship exists).
24. See id. at 842 (indicating that school officials desired to keep Washington
with his classmates).
25. See id. (noting that repeating eighth grade did not improve Washington's
grades).
26. See id. (determining that Washington entered ninth grade during second
semester of 1994-1995 academic year).
27. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842 (noting that Washington's grades did not
improve).
28. See id. (following advice of high school counselor).
29. See id. (indicating Washington's initial contact with Central Catholic).
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quently entering the school and beginning to play basketball. 30 Mr.
Dunwoody, who was a teacher at Central Catholic as well as Washington's academic mentor, suggested that Washington be tested for
learning disabilities.3 1 Testing in January 1998 revealed that Wash32
ington was indeed learning disabled.
According to the IHSAA's eight semester rule, Washington was
no longer eligible to play basketball during the second semester of
the 1998-1999 school year because this was his ninth semester since
beginning ninth grade. 33 Therefore, Central Catholic applied to
the IHSAA for a waiver of the eight semester rule under IHSAA
Rule C-12-3. 34 In the alternative, Central Catholic also applied for a
waiver for Washington under IHSAA Rule 17-8, known as "the hardship rule." 3 5 Even though it had granted waivers for physical inju-

ries to other students in the past, the IHSAA denied the school's
application for Washington's waiver.3 6 Washington's appeal to the
IHSAA's Executive Committee was also denied. 37 When the IHSAA
refused to grant him a waiver of the eight semester rule, Washing30. See id. (explaining Washington's return to school).
31. See id. (indicating that previous tests did not reveal any learning
disabilities).
32. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842 (reasoning disability as cause of poor academic performance).
33. See id. at 842 (relating purposes of rule). The court pointed out that because Washington had first entered the ninth grade during the second semester of
the 1994-1995 school year, the second semester of the 1998-1999 school year would
be his ninth semester since his commencement of high school. See id. at 842. The
court later explained that the IHSAA's rule "creates ineligibility automatically
eight semesters from the first day of enrollment, even if the student was not enrolled for the full eight semesters." Id. at 852. According to the IHSAA, there are
many purposes for the eight semester rule, including "discouraging red-shirting,
promoting competitive equality, protecting students' safety, creating opportunities
for younger students and promoting the idea that academics are more important
than athletics." Id. at 842. For further discussion of these purposes, see infra note
78.
34. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 842-43 (explaining waiver request). Central
Catholic requested "that the IHSAA not count the semesters that he was not enrolled in any high school for purposes of eligibility under the eight semester rule."
Id. at 843. 1THSAA Rule G-12-3 allows an exemption of the eight semester rule "if a
student is injured which necessitates the student's complete withdrawal from the
school or prohibits enrollment in the school for that semester, and the student
does not receive any academic credit for that semester." Id.
35. See id. (proposing non-enforcement of rule in light of Washington's learning disability). IHSAA Rule 17-8 gives the IHSAA the authority "not to enforce a
rule if strict enforcement in the particular case would not serve to accomplish the
purpose of the rule, the spirit of the rule would not be violated, and there is a
showing of undue hardship in the particular case." Id.
36. See id. at 843 (indicating that IHSAA refused to apply exception from Rule
17-8).
37. See id. (stating that Washington's appeal was unsuccessful).
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ton brought suit against the IHSAA, claiming that the waiver refusal

38
violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

III.

A.

BACKGROUND

Applicable Disability Acts

This Note focuses on two pieces of legislation as applied to disabled student-athletes. The first, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
provides protection to disabled persons who have been discrimi39
nated against by programs receiving federal financial assistance.
The second, the Americans with Disabilities Act, provides protec40
tion to disabled individuals from discrimination by public entities.
1. RehabilitationAct of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states, " [n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....

41

Thus, the elements necessary to prove a cause of action for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are: (1) the plaintiff is a "disabled person" under the Act; (2) the plaintiff is "otherwise
qualified" to participate in the program; (3) the plaintiff is being
excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program solely by reason
of his or her handicap; and (4) the relevant program or activity is
42
receiving federal financial assistance.
The first element requires that the plaintiff be an "individual
with a disability" under the Act. 43 The Act defines an "individual
38. See id. (indicating basis for suit under ADA). The court also noted that
Washington would be ineligible to participate in high school athletics during the
1999-2000 school year because his participation would violate another IHSAA eligibility rule which limits the maximum age at which a student can compete in athletics ("the age limit rule"). However, this rule was not challenged in this case, so the
focus was exclusively on the eight semester rule. See id.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) (1994). For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see

infra notes 41-63.
40. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For a discussion of the ADA, see
infra notes 64-83.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
42. See Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989) (delineating four elements of cause of action
under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (stating that those with disabilities shall not be excluded from participation in federally-funded activities because of such disability).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/5

6

2000]

Larochelle: Maintaining Athletics as an Important Part of a High School Educa
MAINTAINING ATHuTcs

307

with a disability" as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment." 44 Major life activities include "caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 For example, the
court in Pahulu v. University of Kansas,46 suggested that playing foot47
ball could be a major life activity - the activity of learning.
The second element requires that the plaintiff be "otherwise
qualified" to participate in the program. 48 The Supreme Court in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis49 defined an "otherwise qualified" individual as "one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 50 Therefore, professional
44. Id. § 706(8) (B).
45. See 34 C.F.R. 104.3(j) (2) (ii) (1999).
46. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D.C. Kan. 1995).
47. See id. at 1393 (finding that not being allowed to play football was not
substantial limitation on opportunity to learn). In this case, the plaintiff suffered a
hit to the head during a football scrimmage and, as a result, experienced an episode of transient quadriplegia. See id. at 1388. The team physician and a neurosurgeon determined that the plaintiff had a congenitally narrow cervical canal, and
he would be at risk for severe injury if he continued to play football. However, the
plaintiff emphasized his continuing desire to play football regardless of his physical
condition. See id. As a result, they disqualified the plaintiff from playing intercollegiate football even though he offered to release the University of liability if he were
injured. See id.
The court explored the question of whether playing football is a major life
activity under the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 1390-91. In making this determination, the court applied a subjective test to this particular plaintiff, rather than an
objective test as to the public in general. See id. at 1392 (discussing how regulations
promulgated pursuant to Rehabilitation Act do not clearly define major life activity). The plaintiff testified that playing football had taught him many things including: how to be a team player, discipline, concern for his appearance, concern
for his grades, and the people on the team had inspired him to want a better life
for himself. See id at 1393.
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (stating that disabled individuals must be "qualified" to receive protection).
49. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
50. Id. at 406 (holding that modification of physical requirements was unreasoinabl beLaue failur, to mec, these requirements posed dancrer to patients. In
this case, a woman with a serious hearing disability applied for admission to an
Associate's Degree Nursing Program at Southeastern Community College ("Southeastern") to be trained as a certified nurse. See id. at 400. An audiologist found
that she could only understand speech directed at her if she was also able to lipread. See id. at 403. The Executive Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing determined that the woman's hearing disability could interfere with her ability
to care safely for her patients. See id. at 402. Therefore, the woman was not admitted to the program because she would be unable to perform certain physical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified" under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 406 (stating that "otherwise qualified" person could
meet all requirements despite handicap).
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schools may deny an applicant admission to their clinical training
program if the applicant is unable to perform all the necessary
physical requirements. The Davis court took this one step further,
stating that the physical requirements for admission also had to be
51

reasonable.
The court in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry52 further ex-

plained and refined the definition of "otherwise qualified." 5 3 The
court questioned whether some "reasonable accommodation"
The district court held that because the woman's hearing disability would prevent her from functioning sufficiently as a nurse, it was not discriminatory within
the meaning of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for Southeastern to exclude
her from the program. See id. at 403-04 (grounding its own holding in lower
court's decision). According to the district court, "otherwise qualified" could be
interpreted to mean "otherwise able to function sufficiently in the Position sought
in spite of the handicap, if proper training and facilities are suitable and available."
Id. at 403. Therefore, the district court held that a person did not have to meet
legitimate physical requirements to be considered "otherwise qualified." See id. at
406.
The Supreme Court agreed that Southeastern did not violate section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act when it refused to admit the woman to the nursing program. See id. at 414 (finding that woman might qualify for other related jobs).
However, the Supreme Court altered the district court's "functioning sufficiently"
language, choosing instead to define an "otherwise qualified person" as "one who
is able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his handicap." See id.
at 403, 406 (emphasis added). In this case, the woman was unable to perform all
of the physical clinical requirements as a student in the nursing program because
of her disability, and this could, in turn, pose a danger to her future patients. See
id. at 413 n.12 (indicating that to admit plaintiff, Southeastern would need to
lower standards).
51. See id. at 407 (expressing reasonableness of requirement of speech recognition without lip reading in clinical program). The Supreme Court further identified that there were many situations in which a hearing disability would make it
impossible for a nurse to carry out properly her responsibilities. See id. at 403 (stating necessity of operating room nurse's ability to understand and follow physician's vocal instructions). For a registered nurse, a hearing disability would
prevent her "from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profession . . . [,]" potentially endangering her future patients. Id. Therefore, Southeastern's refusal to modify the physical requirements in this case was
not unreasonable and discriminatory. See id. at 403-04.
52. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).
53. See id. at 574-75 (stating that "otherwise qualified" element is interconnected with reasonable accommodation analysis). In this case, the plaintiff, a
Southern College of Optometry ("SCO") student, suffered from a serious visual
impairment and an associated neurological condition. See id. at 572. SCO required proficiency in a pathology clinic to qualify for participation in a mandatory
externship program. See id. In order to pass, students had to perform various
techniques with specific instruments and, after two attempts, plaintiff was unable
to complete satisfactorily the techniques on four of the instruments. See id. at 57273 (indicating that plaintiff's deteriorated motor skills and coordination prevented
him from satisfying proficiency requirement). Therefore, SCO refused to graduate him from the program or to grant him a degree. See id. at 573. Plaintiff argued
that he was an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, and that the four requirements should not be necessary for
satisfactory completion of the program. See id.
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could be made to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the institution and the handicapped person when the person's handicap prevented him from completing all the physical requirements of the
program. 5 4 The Doherty court clarified that an educational institution "is not required to accommodate a handicapped individual by
eliminating a course requirement which is reasonably necessary to
proper use of the degree conferred at the end of a course of
55
study."
The third element requires that the discrimination against the
plaintiff be "solely by reason" of a disability. 56 According to the
court Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,5 7 section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act prohibits the application of "facially neutral
rules that disproportionately exclude members of the class of disabled persons as compared to members of the class of nondisabled
persons. '58 In Sandison, the court held that students were not ex54. See id. at 575 (deciding that eliminating required courses would be substantial rather than reasonable accommodation). The Doherty court disagreed with
the Davis court's interpretation of an "otherwise qualified" person as anyone who
can meet all the program's requirements despite a handicap. See id. (explaining
Davis holding). The court found this definition paradoxical because it required
the handicapped person to meet all of the program's requirements, which would
mean that there could never be a reasonable requirement in violation of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. (finding as part of "otherwise qualified" analysis, "reasonable accommodation" to be question of fact).
55. Id. (emphasis added). The court held that proficiency with instruments
was necessary to avoid future injury not reasonable accommodation. See id. at 579.
But see Buhai, supra note 1, at 178 (recognizing that "the essential functions of a
position [do] not necessarily depend[ ] on the manner in which [they have] traditionally been performed... [rather] the determinative factor is whether, through
reasonable accommodations, the individual is able to perform these functions") (emphasis added).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (stating that disability must not be sole reason for
exclusion from federally funded activity).
57. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
58. Id. at 1032-33. In this case, two learning disabled students were forbidden
to play interscholastic sports during their senior years of high school because both
turned nineteen a few weeks before their senior year. The Michigan High School
Athletic Association ("MHSAA") had an "age limit rule" that only students under
the age of nineteen at the start of their senior year of high school could compete
in interscholastki sports. See id. at 1029.
The students challenged this rule, arguing that using it to exclude them from
playing interscholastic sports constituted unlawful disability discrimination. See id.
at 1028-29. The court addressed the question of whether these students were excluded "solely by reason" of their disabilities. See id. at 1031. The court decided
that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was intended to eliminate discrimination, but it did not necessarily mandate using "affirmative efforts to overcome the
disabilities caused by handicaps." Id. at 1032 (quoting Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979)). The court further said that the age limit rule was
neutral with respect to disability because it excluded the students "'solely by reason
of' their dates of birth, not 'solely by reason of' [disability]." Id. at 1033. The
students had not been excluded from playing sports during the first three years of
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cluded solely on the basis of disability. 59 Conversely, the court in
Dennin v. Connecticut InterscholasticAthletic Conference60 held that the
plaintiff had been excluded solely by reason of his disability because the "sole reason that Dennin is in school at nineteen is his
disability." 61 Therefore, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act will
be violated if a plaintiff is excluded solely on the basis of disability.
The fourth element is that the "relevant program or activity is
receiving Federal financial assistance." 62 Programs that receive direct, as well as indirect, federal financial assistance fall under sec63
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

2.

The Americans with DisabilitiesAct

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities
against disabled individuals. 64 The ADA states that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the serhigh school; they were only excluded once they reached the maximum age of
nineteen. Id. at 1032. (explaining that rule excluded students because of passage
of time, not disability).
59. See id. at 1032-33 (holding that students' exclusion was not covered by
section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
60. 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
1996).
61. Id. at 670. In Dennin, plaintiff had Down Syndrome and was enrolled in
special needs classes in middle school. As a result he spent four, rather than three
years in middle school, delaying the age at which he began high school. See id. at
666 (indicating that plaintiff entered high school at age sixteen). Plaintiff turned
nineteen before his senior year of high school, making him ineligible to participate in athletics during his senior year under the age limit rule of the Connecticut
Interscholastic Athletic Conference ("CIAC"). See id. (stating that purpose of rule
was to prevent younger athletes from older athletes' competitive advantage).
The court rejected CIAC's argument that plaintiff was not being excluded
solely because of his disability, but rather because of his age. See id. at 669 (reasoning that had it not been for disability delaying entrance to high school, plaintiff
would have remained eligible). The court decided that the plaintiff was "otherwise
qualified" because there existed a reasonable accommodation. See id. at 670 (stating that waiver was reasonable accommodation). The court therefore decided that
the plaintiff should be granted a waiver of the age limit rule under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. See id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
63. See Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 667 (indicating that indirect federal assistance
was subject to section 504 of Rehabilitation Act); see also Reaves v. Mills, 904 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that section 504 of Rehabilitation Act was
enacted to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals by entities receiving
federal financial assistance).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1997) (defining public entity within ADA to include "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
or a State or States or local government"); see also Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that because plaintiff was
not "qualified individual" under ADA, age limit restriction could be enforced).
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vices, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity. '65 It also provides that "[n] o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
. .
operates a place of public
66
accommodation."
Congress intended for the ADA to be consistent with the Rehabilitation Act. 67 Therefore, the analysis and standards under the
two statutes "roughly parallel" one another. 6 However, the reach
of the ADA is much broader because it covers discrimination by
private individuals, "including private owners and operators of
places of public accommodation." 69 The elements necessary to
prove a cause of action under the ADA are: (1) the plaintiff has a
disability; (2) the plaintiff was qualified; and (3) the plaintiff was
denied a reasonable accommodation for the disability or was the
object of an adverse decision made solely because of his or her
70
disability.
The first element requires that plaintiff have a disability as defined under the ADA.7 1 The ADA states that a "disability" means,
"with respect to an individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 7 2 Major life activities
are "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."'78 For example, the court in Bingham v. Oregon School Activities
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1997).
66. See id. § 12182.
67. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930 (stating correlation between ADA and section
504 of Rehabilitation Act).
68. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 460
(6th Cir. 1997) (indicating that purpose and scope of section 504 of Rehabilitation
Act and ADA are largely similar).
69. Id.
70. See id. (explaining elements of ADA claim).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (stating that qualified persons must have disability).
72. See id. § 12102(2).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999). See, e.g., Samuel S. Heywood, Note, Without
Lowering the Bar: Eligibilityfor Reasonable Accommodations on the Bar Examfor Learning
Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 GA. L. Rrv. 603, 62930 (1999) (quoting Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094,
1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd in part, vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998))

(arguing when learning disability prevents individual from "'competing on a level
playing field' on the bar exam, then that individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working").
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Ass 'n74 held that plaintiff was "substantially limited in the major life
'75
activity of learning because of his learning disability.
The second element requires that the plaintiff be a "qualified"
individual under the ADA.7 6 The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,...
or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 77 In order to decide if a modification is reasonable, the court must look to
see if it imposes an undue financial or administrative burden on the
institution making the modification or if it requires a fundamental
78
alteration in the nature of the program.
74. 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Or. 1999).
75. See id. at 1196 (granting waiver of eight semester rule because plaintiff
who repeated sophomore year of high school due to learning disability was disabled under ADA).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (indicating that not all disabilities are covered by
ADA).
77. Id. § 12131(2).
78. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 461
(6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17
(1987)). In McPherson, plaintiff repeated the eleventh grade due to a learning disability which was not actually discovered until his fifth and last year of high school.
See id. at 456.
The beginning of his last year of high school was his ninth semester, which
meant that his participation in athletics would violate the MHSAA's eight semester
rule. See id. The MHSAA's eight semester rule provides that students are ineligible
to participate in athletics after they have been "enrolled in grades nine to twelve,
inclusive, for more than eight semesters." Id. at 455.
The MHSAA refused the plaintiff's request for a waiver of the eight semester
rule because it would "work for a fundamental alteration in Michigan high school
sports programs." Id. at 462. The court agreed with the MHSAA and found that
the waiver of the eight semester rule would not be a reasonable accommodation
because it would impose an undue burden on coaches to determine the competitive fairness of allowing the waiver for each individual case. See id. In addition, the
waiver would threaten the fundamental purposes of the rule which include avoiding red-shirting and preserving the idea that students are in school primarily for
education and only secondarily for athletics. See id. at 461. Therefore, the court
held that the student could not be granted the waiver under the ADA because this
would not be a reasonable accommodation. See id. at 463. But see Bingham, 37 F.
Supp. 2d at 1202. In Bingham, the Oregon School Activities Association's
("OSAA") eight semester rule provided that a student could only participate in
athletics for four consecutive years (eight semesters) after entering the ninth
grade. See id. at 1198. The court found that waiver of the eight semester rule was a
reasonable accommodation for a learning disabled student. The court further explained that barring a disabled student, who is disabled by no fault of his or her
own, from participating in athletics is "fundamentally no different from barring
him or her from auditioning for the school play, attending the prom, or taking a
history class in the interest of giving everyone an equal opportunity of eight semesters to experience all the benefits of high school." Id. at 1202.
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The third element requires that the plaintiff was denied a reasonable accommodation for the disability or was the object of an
adverse employment decision made solely because of his disabil-

ity. 79 As the court in Thomas v. Davidson Academy 0 held, an accommodation can be defined as "any change . . . in the way things are
customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal opportunities." 8' According to Rhodes v. Ohio High School
Athletic Ass'n, 82 the court must make a factual determination on a
case-by-case basis in deciding whether a reasonable modification is
available to satisfy the legitimate interests of both the institution
8 3
and the individual requesting the accommodation.
79. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 460. For a discussion of what constitutes a reasonable modification and when one will be granted, see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
80. 846 F. Supp. 611, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
81. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1994)). In Thomas, the plaintiff, a student at Davidson Academy, was diagnosed with idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura ("ITP"). See id. at 614. According to the court, a person with ITP is
"susceptible to life-threatening bleeding or hemorrhaging and must take great
care to avoid, and promptly attend to, even seemingly minor physical traumas that
are a part of daily life." Id.
One particular day, plaintiff cut herself with an exacto knife during art class,
causing her to become hysterical. See id. at 615. After this incident, the principal
decided that plaintiff should withdraw from Davidson Academy. See id.
The court held that plaintiffs reaction to her injury was extreme but understandable considering her medical condition and her knowledge of its possible
consequences. See id. at 618-19. The court went on to say that "blind adherence to
policies and standards resulting in a failure to accommodate a person with a disability is precisely what the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and [section 504
of] the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are intended to prevent." Id. at 619. Therefore,
it was a reasonable accommodation to allow the plaintiff to remain enrolled at
Davidson Academy, and this would not substantially modify the school's existing
standards or interfere with the school's goal of keeping order. See id. at 619.
82. 939 F. Supp. 584 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
83. See id. at 591 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Rhodes, the plaintiff, who was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD") when he was in the fourth grade,
spent one extra year in high school. See id. at 586.
When the plaintiff entered his fifth and senior year of high school, he was
ineligible to participate in athletics because the Ohio High School Athletic Association ("OHSAA") had a rule that once a student "completes the eighth grade, the
student shall be eligible [to compete in high school athletics] for a period not to
exceed eight scmesters --ken in order of Attendance, whether the student participates or not." Id. The plaintiff had only participated in seven semesters of athletics, but he had already been enrolled in high school for eight semesters; therefore,
he was denied athletic eligibility. See id.
The court decided that it was necessary to make factual determinations about
whether the eight semester requirement was essential and whether there was a
reasonable accommodation that would satisfy the interests of all the parties. See id.
at 591. The court held that the eight semester rule accomplishes three important
purposes: it prevents red-shirting; it limits the athletic experience and skill of players to keep the playing field even; and it encourages athletes to graduate in four
years. See id. at 591-92. In the end, the court decided that the plaintiff could not
win his claim because he was not denied eligibility based solely on his disability, but
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B.

Athletic Eligibility Requirements

1. Eight Semester Rules
Many high school athletic associations have implemented a
rule making students who have completed eight semesters of high
school ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics ("eight semester rule").84 The court in McPherson v. Michigan High School
Ass'n, Inc.,8 5 explained that there are several rationales for implementing an eight semester rule, including creating a fair sense of
competition, 8 6 preventing red-shirting8 7 and preserving the idea
that students are in school primarily for classroom education and
only secondarily for athletic participation.8 8 Other purposes include ensuring students' safety and ensuring that all students have
an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic athletics. 8

9

Although the purposes of the eight semester rule are valuable,
application of the rule to disabled students must be examined
closely. In deciding whether to grant a waiver of the eight semester
rule, courts have asked whether the rule is "an 'essential' eligibility
requirement and/or whether a waiver of that rule is a reasonable
modification as a way of accommodating ... [a student's] disabilrather based only on the fact that he was enrolled in high school for more than
eight semesters. See id. at 592.
84. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 455 (holding that student diagnosed with ADD
would not be granted waiver of eight semester rule); see also Frye v. Mich. High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 121 F.3d at 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that student
diagnosed with ADD would not be granted waiver of eight semester rule); Bingham,
37 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (granting waiver of the eight semester rule as reasonable
accommodation).
85. 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
86. See id. at 456. The fair sense of competition is created by limiting the
players' level of experience and skill so that a more level playing field can be maintained. See id. at 456.
87. See id. According to the court in McPherson, without such an eligibility
requirement, coaches might engage in red-shirting. See id. Red-shirting is the
practice of holding an athlete back for a year to allow the student time to reach
both physical and athletic maturity, so that he or she can increase athletic ability.
See id.
88. See id. (stating goal that students will be encouraged to finish high school
in four years); see also John P. Encarnacion, Note, When a Handicap May Be an
Advantage: McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Association Evaluates the Relationship of the RehabilitationAct and the ADA to Athletic Association Maximum Semester
Rules, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 327, 328 (1998) (noting that schools maintain
eligibility requirements because of alarming trend in many athletic programs to
place more emphasis on competitiveness than on academics).
89. See Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1201; see also Encarnacion, supranote 88, at
362 (suggesting that waivers of eight semester rule should be granted when student has legitimate disability and there is no threat of red-shirting).
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ity." 90 Some courts have held that it is not an essential eligibility
requirement and that a reasonable modification is appropriate to
accommodate a student whose disability was the reason for the ineligibility. 9 1 However, other courts, such as McPherson and Frye v.
Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc.92 have held that waiver of the
eight semester rule alters sports programs, and the eight semester
rule is "necessary" to the successful functioning of any high school
93
sports program.
2.

Maximum Age Requirements

Several high school athletic associations have also implemented a rule forbidding students over age nineteen from participating in high school athletics. 94 As the court in Pottgen v. Missouri

State High School Athletic Ass'n 95 stated, the purposes of a maximum
age requirement include reducing any competitive advantage of
older athletes, protecting younger athletes from injury, discourag90. See Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. In Bingham, the court compared the
Oregon School Activities Association's ("OSAA") eight semester rule with its attendance-grade rule (which sets minimum attendance and grade requirements for
athletic eligibility) and age rule (which limits athletic eligibility to students who
turn nineteen on or after August 15 of any given year). See id. at 1197-98, 1201.
Both the attendance-grade rule and the age rule provide for exceptions when
learning disabled students are unable to meet the rules' requirements due to their
handicapped condition. See id. at 1197-98.
The provision for exceptions to both of these rules do not frustrate the purposes of the eligibility requirements and do not constitute a risk to the safety and
health of other students. See id. The OSAA does not, however, have a similar provision for exceptions under the eight semester rule. See id. at 1199. The court
asserted that the purposes of the eight semester rule and the other eligibility rules
are similar, including promoting safety and competitive fairness, encouraging students to complete high school in four years and granting equal opportunities to all
students to participate in athletics without displacing otherwise eligible students by
giving other students extra eligibility. See id. at 1201. Therefore, it would make no
sense to grant a waiver to a student who repeated the seventh grade but not grant a
waiver to a student who repeated the tenth grade because it would violate the eight
semester rule. See id. Ultimately, the court held that waivers of the eight semester
rule for disabled students unable to complete high school in eight semesters due
to their disability are reasonable modification. See id. at 1202.
91. See id. at 1201 (allowing waiver of eligibility requireinellts).
92. 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).
93. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 46162 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Frye v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 121 F.3d 708
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that waiver of eight semester rule for learning disabled
student entering his fifth year of high school was inappropriate); Rhodes v. Ohio
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584 (D. Ohio 1996) (holding that waiver of
eight semester rule for learning disabled student was not appropriate).
94. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1029
(6th Cir. 1995). For a detailed discussion of Sandison, see supra note 58.
95. 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
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ing athletes from delaying their educations to gain athletic maturity
96
and preventing coaches from engaging in red-shirting.
Even though these objectives are favorable, courts have also
scrutinized application of the maximum age requirement to disabled students. In deciding whether to grant a waiver of the maximum age requirement, courts have evaluated whether it is an
essential eligibility requirement and whether a reasonable accommodation exists. 97 Some courts, including the courts in Pottgen and
Reaves v. Mill 8 have held that the maximum age requirement is an
essential eligibility requirement, and a waiver could fundamentally
alter the nature of the athletic program, making the waiver unreasonable.9 9 However, the court in Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic
Athletic Conference took the view that the maximum age requirement
is not essential if a reasonable modification can be made which
does not undermine the purposes of the requirement. 10 0 The Dennin court, relying on Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass'n,
Inc.,10 1 explained that an individualized analysis of the relationship
between the requirement and its purposes could be used in decid10 2
ing if a reasonable waiver could be made.
96. See id. at 927. For a definition of red-shirting, see supra note 87. In
Pottgen, plaintiff repeated two grades during elementary school because of an undiagnosed learning disability. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 927. Therefore, when he
reached his senior year of high school, the maximum age requirement of the Missouri State High School Athletic Association ("MSHSAA") made him ineligible to
play high school athletics. See id. at 928. The court decided that plaintiff should
not receive a waiver of the maximum age requirement. See id. at 931.
97. See id. at 930.
98. 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
99. See Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931 (denying waiver of necessary maximum age requirement because waiver would alter nature of athletic program and impose undue financial and administrative burdens on school). See Reaves, 904 F. Supp. at
120 (holding that student who had repeated first grade due to status as educable
mentally retarded should not be granted waiver of maximum age requirement to
play athletics during senior year of high school).
100. See Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp.
663, 668 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996). For a discussion of Dennin, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. In Dennin, the court
rejected the argument of the Pottgen and Sandison courts that the maximum age
requirement was essential and no waiver could be reasonable because it would
constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program. See id. at 668.
101. 899 F. Supp. 579 (l1th Cir. 1995).
102. See Dennin,913 F. Supp. at 668 (citingJohnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities
Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d 1172
(lth Cir. 1997) (holding that granting waiver of maximum age requirement to
deaf student would not undermine purposes of requirement to promote safety and
fairness because plaintiff was not largest player on football team and would participate in appropriate weight division for wrestling)); see also Univ. Interscholastic
League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that granting
waiver of maximum age requirement to two learning disabled students was reason-
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IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit in Washington v. IndianaHigh School Athletic
Ass'n, Inc. considered whether refusal to grant a waiver of a high
school athletic association's eight semester rule to a student-athlete
whose learning disability caused him to fail at school violated Title
II of the ADA. 10 3 The court held that the IHSAA violated Title II of
the ADA when it refused to make the reasonable accommodation
4
of waiving the eight semester requirement for Washington. 10 The
court began its analysis by addressing the question of whether the
issue was now moot because Washington's basketball season had already finished. 10 5 The court explained that an "actual controversy
still exist[ed] despite the end of the basketball season because Central Catholic [was] still a party to the litigation." 10 6 Therefore, the
10 7
court retained jurisdiction over the case.
able accommodation under Rehabilitation Act); Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic
League, No. A-90-CA-764, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20835 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990)
(holding that strict application of maximum age requirement was unmerited in
circumstances of this case, which clearly required special consideration for plaintiff, who suffered from learning disabilities caused by meningococcal meningitis);
Lewis, supra note 7, at 108 (stating that learning disabled students are entitled to
individualized analysis, otherwise they "are victimized by the mechanical application of useful, but arbitrary eligibility standards").
103. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 843 (holding that eight semester rule violated
student-athlete's rights under ADA). The district court had granted plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the IHSAA from denying Washington
athletic eligibility. See id. at 845.
104. See id. at 845. The court adopted a test balancing the interests of the
parties. See id. at 853. Washington's participation in athletics gave him confidence
and improved his academic performance. See id. The IHSAA argued that determining who is eligible for waivers would cause undue financial and administrative
burdens to the IHSAA. See id. at 853. In addition, the IHSAA argued that another
student-athlete would be unfairly displaced if Washington were granted the waiver
and Washington's participation would unfairly change the level of competition.
See id. at 844.
105. See id. at 844. The court pointed out that there must be a controversy at
every stage of the court's review. See id.; see also U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980).
106. Id. Pursuant to IHSAA Rule 17-6, penalties may retroactively be imposed
on student-athletes and their schools if they are ineligible under the iHSAA's rules
but are allowed to participate in athletics through the issuance of a restraining
order of injunction from the court. According to this IHSAA rule, if the injunction is later reversed or vacated, the IHSAA has the authority to "strike individual
and team records, require forfeit of victories won by the team, or require return of
individual and team awards earned while the student participated." Id. at 844-45
(citing Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir.
1992)). Therefore, Central Catholic still had an interest in this case because the
basketball team's victories and records might be forfeited if the injunction were
vacated. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 845.
107. See id.
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Next, the court addressed the question of what standard a district court should apply in deciding whether to grant a preliminary
injunction. 10 8 The court stated that a district court must: (1) determine whether the moving party demonstrated a likelihood success
on the merits and an inadequate remedy at law if preliminary relief
is not granted; (2) weigh that irreparable harm to the nonmoving
party; and (3) weigh the public interest by considering the effect on
nonparties of granting or denying the injunction. 10 9
The court first looked to whether the district court had correctly determined that Washington and Central Catholic had
demonstrated a "[1]ikelihood of success on the merits" by showing
that they had a "better than negligible" chance of succeeding on
the merits.1 10 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit looked to what a
plaintiff must prove in order to fall under the protection of Title II
of the ADA."' The court stated that plaintiffs must show that the
IHSAA deemed Washington ineligible to participate in athletics "by
reason of" his disability. 112 However, the Seventh Circuit pointed
out that liability under the ADA need not be premised on inten1 13
tional discrimination based on disability.
Relying on the analysis by the court in McPherson v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass'n, the Seventh Circuit decided that discrimination could be established by proving that: (1) defendant acted
intentionally based on disability; (2) defendant refused to provide a
108. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 845.
109. See id. The Seventh Circuit explained that the decision whether to grant

a preliminary injunction involves various issues. Some are non-discretionary, while
others, such as weighing the respective harms, are highly discretionary and must

be given substantial deference. See id. Therefore, the court first examined
whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. See
id. at 845-46.
110. Id. at 846 (quoting Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc.,
128 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1997)).

111. See id. at 846.
112. Id. The court here pointed out that the district court addressed the "by
reason of disability" and "qualified individual" requirements as one element. The
court further pointed out that it agreed with the district court's characterization of

the two requirements although they addressed the issues separately because the
IHCAA raised separate conditions relating to the two requirements. See id. at 846.
113. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 848. The IHSAA argued that plaintiffs
presented no evidence that the IHSAA discriminated against Washington intentionally. However, the Seventh Circuit explained that the Supreme Court had implied that requiring a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent would be
contradictory to Congress' intent. See id. at 846 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985)). "Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference .... " Washington, 181 F.3d at 846 (quoting Choate, 469
U.S. at 296).
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reasonable modification; or (3) defendant's rule disproportionately
impacted disabled individuals.' 14 The Washington court held that
the plaintiffs must prove that the IHSAA failed to provide a reasonable accommodation when it refused to grant Washington a waiver
of the eight semester rule. 1 5 The court then explored the question
of whether there was a causal connection between Washington's
disability and his ineligibility.' 16 The court held that "[i]n the absence of his disability, the passage of time would not have made
117
him ineligible" to participate in athletics.
Next, the Seventh Circuit explored whether Washington was a
"qualified individual" under the ADA and, therefore, able to meet
the eligibility requirement with a reasonable accommodation. 1 8
Relying on the Supreme Court in School of Nassau County v. Arline,' 19
the court in Washington determined that an individualized assessment was necessary to determine if a waiver of the eight semester
rule would be a reasonable accommodation.1 20 In order to make
this individualized assessment, the court must look to several factors
including, "the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether
114. See id. at 847 (citing McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119
F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1997)). The court in Washington accepted the McPherson
court's view that discriminatory intent was not necessary to establish a claim for
discrimination under the ADA. See id. at 848. Therefore, "a facially neutral rule
adopted for neutral purposes and applied on a neutral basis is not always insulated
from review." Id. at 847 n.10.
115. See id. at 847. The court looked to the legislative history of Titles I and
III of the ADA, explaining that the methods of proving discrimination under Titles
I and III apply to Title II as well. See id. at 848. Therefore, the court decided that
"Congress clearly intended the failure-to-accommodate method of proving discrimination to apply to Title II." Id.
116. See id. at 848-49. The IHSAA argued that Washington was not excluded
from participating in athletics by reason of his disability, but rather by the passage
of time. See id. at 848. As the court stated, the IHSAA relied on the holding in
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, which stated that "the regulation
[was] a 'neutral rule' - neutral, that is, with respect to disability . . . ." Id. at 848
(quoting Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir.
1995)).
117. Id. at 849. The court determined that Washington had proven causation
because his disability had caused him to drop out of school which, in turn, made
him unable to meet the eight semester requirement. See id.
118. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 849. As the court explained, under both Title
II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a "qualified individual" is
an individual with a disability or handicap who is able to meet eligibility requirements with some kind of reasonable accommodation. See id.
119. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
120. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 851 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987)).
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reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will
12 1
mitigate the risk."
The court distinguished between the eight semester rule discussed in the present case ("Indiana rule") with the eight semester
rule discussed in McPherson ("Michigan rule").' 22 The court
pointed out that the Michigan rule in McPherson restricted athletic
eligibility to eight semesters of enrollment in high school, whereas
the Indiana rule in the present case "creat[ed] ineligibility automatically eight semesters from the first day of enrollment, even if the
student was not enrolled for the full eight semesters."1 23 Ultimately, the court in Washington held that the goals of the eight semester rule would not be frustrated by allowing Washington a
1 24
waiver of the requirement.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit balanced the interests of the parties and held that the irreparable harm to Washington, if he were
not allowed to participate in athletics, outweighed the interests of
the IHSAA and the public. 125 Therefore, the court affirmed the
district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction granting
121. Id. at 851 n.14 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 274). According to the Washington court, this is the test established by the Supreme Court in Arline. See id. at 851.
Essentially, some exceptions should be made to the general eight semester requirement in order to afford opportunities to disabled individuals. See id. at 851.
122. See id. at 852.
123. Id. The court explained that under the Indiana rule, the eligibility clock
continued to "tick" even when Washington was not enrolled, but under the Michigan rule, the clock would stop when the student was not actually enrolled. See id.
In this case, Washington was only asking that the IHSAA not count the time he was
not enrolled in high school in deciding his eligibility under the eight semester
rule. See id.
124. See id. The goals of the eight semester rule included preventing redshirting, emphasizing that academics are more important than athletics and keeping larger, more experienced players from dominating the competition. See id. at
852. The court explained, however, that Washington clearly was not red-shirted
because no one was interested in his athletic talent until after he dropped out of
school. See id. Additionally, participation in athletics was actually promoting his
education because he had gone back to high school and improved his grades
partly due to the influence of his basketball coach. See id. The court rejected the
IHSAA's argument that a waiver would result in a fundamental alteration of the
eight semester rule because the IHSAA had granted similar waivers of the eight
semester rule in the past. See id. Similarly, the court determined that there would
be no undue financial or administrative burden on the IHSAA if it had to make a
few case by case analyses of whether disabled students should be granted waivers.
See id.
125. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 853. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that if Washington were not allowed to participate in athletics, he
would not only lose his academic motivation but also the possibility of receiving a
college scholarship. See id. The court pointed to a school psychologist's opinion
that Washington's success in basketball improved his confidence in other areas of
his life, including his education. See id.; see also Burroughs, supra note 4, at 62
(discussing how person's emotional and social development is affected by learning
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Washington a waiver of the eight semester rule and allowing him to
1 26
continue participating in athletics.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Seventh Circuit held that the IHSAA's refusal to accommodate reasonably Washington by granting him a waiver of the
eight semester rule violated Title II of the ADA. 127 This Note suggests that the Seventh Circuit broadened the protection available to
disabled students who bring claims under the ADA and the Rehabil128
itation Act.
A.

Reasonable Accommodations

Over the past few years, there have been many cases involving
disabled student-athletes bringing discrimination claims under
both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 129 The courts are split
regarding whether waiver of the eligibility requirements should be
granted. 130 The Washington court followed the developing trend of
a minority of courts in finding that waiver of an eligibility requiredisabilities). For a discussion of the interests of the IHSAA and the public, see
infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
126. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 854. The court decided that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in balancing the interests of the parties. See id.
127. See id. at 841.
128. See Jason L. Thomas, Note, Through the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
High School Athletes are Saying "PutMe In Coach": Sandison v. Michigan High School
Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995), 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 727, 762 (1997)
(criticizing Sandison court as effectively eliminating disabled student-athletes' use
of disability legislation to gain equal opportunities). There has been an increase
in the number of individuals diagnosed with learning disabilities, causing them to
fall behind academically. See id. However, "[athletics ] are an important part of life
and maturation. Therefore, courts should be sensitive to the need to reasonably
accommodate disabled student athletes into programs... to eliminate the neglect
and discrimination of disabled individuals." Id. (citing Johnson v. Fla. High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1995)).
129. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 845; see also McPherson v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997); Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n,
37 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Or. 1999). For purposes of this Note, claims under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act can be evaluated using very similar standards so
that one act is applicable to the other.
130. See, e.g., McPherson, 119 F.3d at 453 (denying learning disabled student's
request for waiver of eight semester rule because waiver threatened purposes of
rule); Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that elimination of clinical efficiency requirement was not reasonable accommodation). But see Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (granting waiver of eight
semester rule as reasonable accommodation because plaintiff was disabled under
ADA in major life activity of learning); Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic
Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663, 671 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that student-athlete
should be granted waiver of eligibility requirement).
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ment was a reasonable accommodation. 13 1 Consistent with these
cases, the Washington court held that intentional discrimination was
not necessary to establish a discrimination claim. 13 2 Instead the
court followed the view that requiring the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent would be contrary to Congress' intent in passing this
133
legislation.
Courts are also split on whether reasonable accommodations
of athletic eligibility requirements should be granted in both ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims. The Washington court followed one
line of cases which held that reasonable accommodations should be
made to student-athletes who do not meet the maximum age eligibility requirements due to learning disabilities because waiver of
the requirement does not alter the nature of the athletic programs. 13 4 The Washington court followed these cases in their analysis of eligibility requirement, and the court held that "some
to allow opexceptions ought to be made to general requirements
135
disabilities."
with
individuals
to
portunities
131. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 849-51; see also Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at
1202 (holding that waiver of eight semester rule was reasonable accommodation);
Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 889 F. Supp. 579, 585 (D. Fla. 1995)
(holding that waiver of age requirement would not fundamentally alter nature of
program); Buhai, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that "[a]ccommodation of disabilities is critical to allow people with disabilities the chance to achieve their goals, and
also to dispel the myth that they are inadequate in some way").
132. See Washington, 181 F.3d at 848. The court found that "a facially neutral
rule adopted for neutral purposes and applied on a neutral basis is not always
insulated from review." Id. at 847 n.10.
133. See id. at 846. The court here relied on the Supreme Court's finding in
Alexander v. Choate that Congress clearly did not intend the statutes to apply to only
cases of intentional discrimination. If discriminatory intent were a necessary element of these claims, plaintiffs would not be able to recover for discriminatory
actions against them that were intended to be prevented by this legislation. See id.
(citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-97 (1985)); see also McPherson, 119
F.3d at 460 (holding that plaintiff possibly could have relied on disparate impact
theory in bringing ADA discrimination claim).
134. See Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp.
663, 670 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that because plaintiff is otherwise qualified
when offered some reasonable accommodation, he must be granted waiver of age
requirement because waiver does not undermine its purposes); see alsoJohnson, 899
F. Supp. at 585 (holding that analysis of relationship between age requirement and
its purposes indicates that granting waiver of requirement would not fundamentally alter nature of program); Univ. Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848
S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that special determinations for disabled students are reasonable accommodations that advance purposes of Rehabilitation Act and maximum age requirement); Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic League,
No. A-90-CA-764, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20835 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4,1990) (holding
that requiring special consideration of disabled plaintiff was reasonable
accommodation).
135. Washington, 181 F.3d at 851.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/5

22

20001

Larochelle: Maintaining Athletics as an Important Part of a High School Educa
MAINTAINING ATHLETICS

323

Other courts have held that waivers of the athletic eligibility
requirements are not reasonable accommodations.1 3 6 The Washington court's rejection of this view effectively expanded the rights
of disabled student-athletes to prevent high school athletic associations from refusing waivers of athletic eligibility requirements. The
Washington court refused to follow the reasoning of the court in
McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, holding that granting a waiver to Washington would not alter the nature of the eight
37
semester rule.
B.

The "By Reason of the Disability" Language

The Washington court held that to constitute a violation under
the ADA there must be a causal connection between the disability
and the ineligibility. 138 Therefore, the Washington court correctly
rejected the holdings in both McPherson and Sandison v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass'n when it held that application of a seemingly
neutral "passage of time" rule was inappropriate as applied to disabled student-athletes. 139 The holding in Washington increased the
opportunities for disabled student-athletes to overcome athletic eligibility requirement barriers by rejecting the "passage of time" argu140
ment, which only veils the underlying discrimination.
136. See, e.g., Frye v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 121 F.3d 708 (6th
Cir. 1997); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir.
1997); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995);
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988); Rhodes v. Ohio High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584 (D. Ohio 1996); Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp.
120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
137. See McPherson, 119 F.3d at 463 (holding that allowing waivers of eight
semester rule would place undue administrative burdens on athletic associations to
determine who should be granted waivers and that waivers would threaten fundamental purposes of eight semester rule); see also Washington, 119 F.3d at 852. The
court explained that Washington's waiver request asked for a minimal rule modification and that the IHSAA had granted waivers in the past that did not cause any
fundamental alterations of the rule. See id.
138. See Washington, 119 F.3d at 848. The court looked to the holdings of the
courts in both McPherson and Sandison when it held that but for Washington's
disability, h,..... , not have droppe ou,
t of school and consequently. would not
have been ineligible under the eight semester rule. See id. at 848-49.
139. Id. at 849. The McPherson and Sandison courts held that the eligibility
requirements did not exclude students by reason of their disabilities, but rather, by
reason of the passage of time. See id. at 848-49.
140. See id. at 849. The Washington court recognized that the "passage of
time" argument ignored the fact that the disability had something to do with the
amount of time the students had been in school. See id. at 849 n.12. In other
words, if it had not been for his disability, Washington would not have needed to
be in high school for more than eight semesters. See id. at 849.
Similarly, the court in Bingham v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n stated that the
narrow "passage of time" rule "ignores the realities of the impact of the rule on
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C.

Balancing of the Interests

The Washington court held that an individualized assessment
should be made of each student requesting a waiver, rather than
requiring application of a blanket policy against waivers.14 1 The
Washington court followed a growing trend allowing individualized
assessments of student-athletes in deciding whether to grant waivers
of the athletic eligibility requirements.1 42 Several courts, including
the court in Washington, have balanced the student-athletes' interests in participating in athletics with the athletic associations' interests in upholding the purposes of the athletic eligibility
requirements.1 43 The Washington court rejected arguments that
granting a waiver to Washington would place undue financial and
administrative burdens on the IHSAA.1 44 Rather, the court followed the view that the irreparable harm to Washington in being
denied the opportunity to participate in athletics outweighed any
burdens on the IHSAA. 145 Ultimately, the court in Washington took
a strong stance in protecting the rights of disabled student-athletes
to gain the same advantages as their non-disabled classmates.
VI.

IMPACT

The Seventh Circuit's broad holding regarding the protections
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA will have a profound effect
those who, through no fault of their own, because they are disabled - find themselves still in high school for a 5th year." Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202 (D.
Or. 1999).
141. See, e.g., Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic League, No. A-90-CA-764, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20835 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990) (holding that strict enforcement
of eligibility requirements would undermine objectives of Rehabilitation Act without advancing policies of eligibility requirements). Several courts, including Washington, have recognized the importance of athletics in increasing students' selfesteem, motivation and desire to perform well academically. See Washington, 119
F.3d at 853. The Washington court noted that Washington's grades improved when
he was playing basketball, but he had lost his academic motivation when the eight
semester rule barred him from playing. See id.
142. See, e.g., Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F.
Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996);Johnson v.
Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 584-85 (D. Fla. 1995), vacated
as moot, 102 F.3d 1172 (l1th Cir. 1997); Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. For
further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 61, 78, 131 and accompanying
text.
143. See Washington, 119 F.3d at 851 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
144. See id. at 852. The court rejected the IHSAA's argument that it would
face financial and administrative burdens in determining who was eligible for a
waiver of the eight semester rule. See id. Instead, the court explained that Washington was the first student-athlete to bring such a claim in over a decade. See id.
145. See id. at 853.
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on the ability of disabled student-athletes to obtain waivers of athletic eligibility requirements. There are more than 200,000 students diagnosed with learning disabilities each year. 146 Many of
these students lack the self-confidence necessary to succeed academically, and participation in athletics can give them the self-con147
fidence and motivation necessary to succeed.
Rather than applying a strict interpretation of the eight semester rule, the court in Washington recognized the importance of athletics to a high school education. 148 Both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act emphasize that the activity of learning is a major
life activity.1 49 Participation in athletics truly is a part of that major
life activity of learning. Through participation in athletics, studentathletes increase their self-esteem, improve their social skills and
learn self-discipline.

15 0

Unfortunately, learning disabled student-athletes often experience feelings of inferiority and insecurity because they must struggle to compete academically with their non-disabled classmates. 15 1
All students have the potential to accomplish great goals in their
1 52
lives, and accomplishment of these goals begins with education.
The Washington court realized that the strict application of athletic
eligibility requirements will only hinder disabled students' ability to
succeed.153 As one commentator asked, "Why must disabled ath146. See Freitas, supra note 4, at 139.
147. See, e.g., Washington, 119 F.3d at 853. The court pointed out that Washington had excelled in basketball, which improved his self-esteem in other areas of
his life. When he found out that he would be ineligible to participate in athletics,
he lost the motivation to do well academically. See id.
148. See Encarnacion, supra note 88, at 361 (stating that "mere existence of a
mechanism for semester rule waivers . . . seems to imply that the rule is not a
necessary requirement"). For a discussion of how athletics benefited Washington,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
149. See 34 C.F.R. § 10 4.3(j) (2) (ii) (1999); see also29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1991).
150. See Evale, supra note 1, at 136 (outlining benefits to student-athletes due
to their participation in athletics).
151. See id.
152. See ames A. Lovegren. Making the Grade: LearningDisabled Student-Athletes
and the NCAA's Eligibility Requirements, 6 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 214 (1999) (recognizing that there should be academic requirements to make student-athletes eligible
to participate in athletics, but that "under a one-size-fits-all approach, some potential athletes who would have become better educated citizens, will undoubtedly fall
through the cracks by not 'qualifying' for academic scholarships, thereby preventing them from attending college at all"). Therefore, a "happy medium" must be
found when applying athletic and academic requirements to student-athletes, especially those with learning disabilities. See id.
153. See Washington, 119 F.3d at 853. Washington's self-esteem decreased, and
he lost the desire to succeed academically when he was told that he could no
longer participate in athletics. See id.
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letes put in a request to be treated like others?"1 54 The Washington
court's holding will remind other courts that "we are all on the
same side in this game. We want to provide our young with all the
1 55
opportunities they need to succeed."

Kristine Larochelle
154. Patricia A. Solfaro, Note, Civil Rights - Courts Should Use an Individualized
Analysis Wen Determining Whether to Grant a Waiver of an Athletic Conference Age Eligibility Rule: Dennin v. Connecticut InterscholasticAthletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp.
663 (2d Cir. 1996), 7 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 185, 218 (1997). This commentator
questioned whether society has lost completely its ability to do what is "the moral,
decent compassionate thing to do" by failing to accommodate disabled individuals
who deserve to participate in athletics as equals with other players. Id.
155. Booth v. Univ. Interscholastic League, No. A-90-CA-764, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20835, at *18 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990).
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